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Purpose – Donors’ decision process in their choice of aid recipients is only partly understood. In particular, it is still unclear whether any imitative behaviour within donors’ decision process actually affects the degree of selectivity in their choice of recipients. This study contributes to fill such a gap by assessing whether the selectivity of donors’ aid allocation reflects an imitative behaviour and, if so, who leads the game and how the game has changed over time.

Methodology – Donors’ selectivity is estimated using the Suits index for the analysis of aid allocations. The evolution of the Suits index is analysed in an autoregressive manner to test whether donors’ selectivity reflects an imitative behaviour.

Findings – This study documents a general increase in aid selectivity with regards to poverty, while selectivity according to governance reveals only limited change. The analysis shows how a redistributive process of donor leadership and influential power over aid allocation has been in place over three decades between 1980 and 2010, with the nineties signing the main phase of transition.

Value – This study contributes to shed light on donor coordination through the identification of leaders and followers among donors in terms of aid selectivity. 








It has been argued that which country aid goes to is an important determinant of its effectiveness: some countries need aid more than others, while some countries can use it better than others (Easterly, 2002). The influential study by Burnside and Dollar (2000) claims that aid is given in vain if to countries with poor institutions and policies, but effective if granted to those with sound institutions. The immediate recommendation of such claim is proposing a kind of performance-based model. This has sparkled renewed attention towards the aid allocation problem. The main question has become how to strike a balance between rewarding good or improved policy and governance and addressing the greatest needs. Focusing on either of the two options would risk constraining aid effectiveness or increasing its inefficiency.

There is little empirically grounded consensus on what donors should select for (Roodman, 2006). Usual concerns focus on a certain biased donors behaviour in terms of aid allocation. In this regard it has been highlighted how some donors behave more altruistically than others. However, it is general opinion that aid allocation has changed over the past two decades – particularly after the fall of the Berlin wall – with an increasing selectivity. 






Dating to Maizels and Nissanke (1984), the analysis of the determinants of who receives aid and why has focused largely on donor strategic intent. The influential study from Alesina and Dollar (2000) open the way to a series of econometric studies that utilize both donor interest and recipient characteristics. In general, research has shown that aid allocation does not seem to be inspired by growth promotion and poverty reduction in recipient countries, at least until the early 1990s. Notably, Alesina and Dollar (2000) show that noneconomic factors, including geopolitical factors, greatly influence aid allocation in addition to development considerations, and Berthélemy (2006) argues that commercial interests may play just as large a role as geopolitical motives for some donors. 

Collier and Dollar (2002) propose a poverty-efficient allocation of aid focused on those countries with a combination of highest poverty and best policy. In particular, they suggest that aid effectiveness in reducing poverty could be almost doubled if aid were allocated selectively, with agreements made only with those countries implementing acceptable policies. Under this perspective, the quality of the policy environment is an ex-ante condition, along the assumption that in the process donors have no influence whatsoever over recipients’ policies. This has induced a few major changes in terms of aid policy, leading to the replacement of the ‘conditionality’ principle with the one of ‘selectivity’. 

On a different line, Mosley et al. (2004) analyse the potential of reducing poverty through aid allocated in support of pro-poor public expenditure. The identification of a significant relationship opens the door to the possibility that policy conditionality could work in selected dimensions (Hudson, 2004).  This appears to be particularly relevant for aid effectiveness, since the bulk of foreign aid is channelled through public spending (McGillivray and Morrissey, 2000). In fact, Verschoor and Kalwij (2006) argue that aid can contribute not just to growth but also to pro-poor growth, suggesting that both aid itself and a recipient government's budget share allocated to social services tend to increase the income elasticity of poverty, and that, moreover, aid tends to increase this budget share. Their results led Mosley et al. (2004) to raise a severe critique to the adoption of the ‘selectivity’ principle and highlight donors’ interest in reconsidering the principle of ‘conditionality’ in a new form with the purpose of engaging with poor performers.​[1]​  

The relevance of the institutional environment towards aid effectiveness is not limited to economic policy, but refers to the wider institutional environment, which is often referred to as governance. In general, in a conducive policy environment good governance is thought to have multiple possible manifestations, ranging from sound economic policy, lack of corruption and solidity of institutions, to civil and political liberties. According to Carter (2014), weighting aid towards recipients with better institutions is justified by the expectation of a better aid absorption capacity. Chauvet and Guillaumont (2004) suggest that aid effectiveness is linked to political stability and Kosack (2003) concludes that aid’s capacity to improve human welfare is effective only in democratic political conditions. Burnside and Dollar (2004) find strong evidence that institutional quality is a determinant for aid effectiveness. Trumball and Wall (1994) find needs and human rights as determinants of aid allocation. On the contrary, according to Rajan and Subramanian (2007), aid may even contribute to reduce governance by reducing the need for governments to govern well. Asra et al. (2005) suggest that the impact of aid is not contingent upon the quality of governance and macroeconomic policy, although the latter is relevant for poverty reduction. 

Some identify the problem of absorption capacity as one of the major constraints to aid effectiveness. In particular, it is often argued that those who need external assistance most are often the ones least able to use it effectively.​[2]​ McGillivray and  Feeny (2009) focus on the effectiveness of aid in the so-called fragile states and find that the situation is rather diversified, with a number of fragile states capable of efficiently absorbing more aid than they have received, while a number receive far more aid than they can efficiently absorb. After all, it is necessary to consider how the recent and ongoing changes in the poverty landscape pose new questions on how to tackle poverty reduction. The increasing share of poor in fragile and middle-income countries remarks how the “poor and stable” profile of ideal aid recipient country is no longer valid, or at least unique (Sumner and Mallett, 2013). Under this perspective, aid effectiveness is not just a matter of aid allocation, but also of its utilization by the recipient country. The functionality of a poverty-efficient approach of aid allocation is linked to the assumption of proper aid utilization by the recipient country (De Matteis, 2013).

Within such a multifaceted system, McGillivray et al. (2006) call for further investigation of the link between policy and aid effectiveness through a better understanding of the transmission mechanisms, while arguing for a broad selectivity approach combining policy with a number of other contingencies such as political stability, democracy and structural vulnerability. Along a different line, according to Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen (2003), reallocating aid to low-income countries with the largest number of poor people would be more effective than a reallocation based only on the quality of policies and institutions.

Aid allocation is increasingly done on the basis of country performance. Amprou et al. (2007) remark how donor ranking changes substantially according to how selectivity is measured. In general, it has been argued that the selectivity of aid allocation based on the quality of governance and general policies has increased significantly since the mid- nineties, particularly among multilateral institutions but also among bilateral agencies, possibly pointing to the emergence of a new model (Bourguignon and Sundberg). Claessens et al. confirm the general improvement in selectivity, with increasing attention to income and countries’ policy and institutional environment and resulting in what appears to be more optimal allocations across countries. Various other studies support the view that donors’ selectivity toward country need and policies has improved over time (Berthélemy and Tichit, 2004; Roodman, 2005; Dollar and Levin, 2006; Sundberg and Gelb, 2006), with a contrarian view expressed by Easterly (2007) and Hout (2007). Consistent with this trend is donor commitment to make aid more predictable on the consideration that volatile aid flows may damage the recipient economies due to boom-bust aid and program delivery cycles and aid-induced Dutch Disease problems (Prati and Tressel, 2006). Nevertheless, there is evidence that aid volatility is still high (Jones, 2015) or has even increased in recent years (Bulíř and Hamann, 2006).

Despite the general trend towards increased selectivity, there is agreement about a certain heterogeneity among donors. Claessens et al. (2009) observe large differences in donors’ selectivity, apparently related to domestic institutional environments. On more general grounds, various studies highlight donors’ heterogeneity in aid supply (Jones, 2015; Hallet, 2009; Bertoli et al., 2008) and allocation (Clist, 2011). However, despite the fact that donors are heterogeneous, they do not act in isolation from one another (Jones, 2015). The consideration that one donor’s decisions may affect others’ has led to argue about a certain ‘peer effect’ (Round and Odedokun, 2004) or ‘herd instinct’ (Frot and Santiso, 2009; Riddell, 2007; Cassen, 1986) or ‘bandwagon effect’ (Jones, 2015) among donors. This remarks some coordination in the behaviour of donors and seems to partly contradict the evidence of substantial heterogeneity in donors’ aid supply behaviour. According to Frot and Santiso (2009) such herding behaviour does not seem to happen for observable reasons, and it may contribute to increase aid volatility. On the contrary, Bertoli et al. (2008) find the peer effect to be insignificant. Mascarenhas and Sandler (2006) and Rowlands and Ketcheson (2002) find only limited evidence of coordination and cooperative behaviour among donors. Along the same line is Aldasoro et al. (2010) and Nunnenkamp et al. (2013) and Steinwand (2015) remark how donor uncoordinated competitive behaviour is on the rise. In particular, it has been highlighted how export competition between donors is a major impediment to aid coordination (Fuchs and Nunnenkamp, 2015).








Clist (2015) provides a critical review of a few measures which have been proposed for the analysis of donors’ aid allocation performance. The methodology used here to examine donors’ selectivity makes use of the Suits index which summarizes the progressivity or regressivity of a distribution. White and McGillivray (1995) recommend the use of the Suits index after examining various possible summary measures of donors’ allocative performance. In previous studies it has been used to assess the distribution of aid against the population of developing countries and against the population of the world’s extreme poor (Baulch, 2003) as well as against non-monetary indicators of poverty (Baulch, 2004). 

For a continuous distribution the Suits index is calculated as:
		(1)

where is the Suits index for donor d, is the cumulative distribution of aid ranked in terms of the variable against which we want to measure selectivity, say in our case poverty.
For a discrete distribution (1) can be approximated as follows:
		(2)

whereis the population share of country i and is the cumulative aid share of country i and of all poorer countries. 





The evolution of the Suits index – as well as of other variables considered in this study – is analysed here in an autoregressive manner. In order to study the interdependence of time series between any pair of donors i and j, we can refer to a linear relationship of the type:
		(3)
where:
		represents the Suits index related to donor i at time t;
		represents the Suits index related to donor j at time t;
		represents the error term;
 and 	represent the coefficients to be estimated.

Once the condition of stationarity of the series and their co-integration are verified, the Error-Correction Mechanism (ECM) is adopted:
		(4)

where s indicates the change of value of the Suits index – related to either donor i or j – between one period and the previous one (t and t-1).

The model above can be interpreted by considering how donors adjust the allocation of their aid budget from one period to the next in response to changes in concurrent adjustments by their relevant peers (in this case indicated by ) as well as to the previous disequilibrium between their allocation and the ones of their relevant peers (in this case identified by the t-1 component). From this perspective the coefficient 2 measures the short-run effect in the process of aid allocation change and the coefficient 3 measures the speed of adjustment. The error correction term  can be interpreted as the deviation from the long-term equilibrium between foreign assistance and poverty, where the coefficient measures the long-run effect in the process of adjustment. 

The half-life index h helps with a summary measure of the process of adjustment of aid selectivity. It measures the number of time units required for the process of adjustment undertaken by one donor to be replicated by another donor, per each pair of donors, before restoring half of the long-run equilibrium between their respective Suits indexes. This is measured as: 
		(5)
where is the estimate of , the coefficient of the lagged difference in:
		(6)





This study covers 20 of the group of DAC countries.​[3]​ Aid is also delivered by non-DAC donors; however data about these other donors is scant and hard to measure in a consistent way.​[4]​ For these reasons, the non-DAC donors were excluded from the analysis. 

The period covered ranges between 1980 and 2010. In terms of aid recipients, the sample size is constrained by data availability: 75 countries satisfy the condition of a minimum data continuity required to conduct time series analysis.​[5]​

For the purposes of this study, donor commitments for foreign assistance would be preferable in contrast to disbursements, since the former most accurately reflect closer with original donor intent. However, it was decided not to use aid commitments as these would reward donors for systematically over-promising aid as well as underestimating the absorptive capacity of aid recipients (Roodman, 2007). We employ OECD data on total net official development aid (ODA) disbursements, expressed in 2010 constant U.S. dollars.

Poverty in recipient countries is expressed in absolute terms: i.e. as the number of individuals who are below the poverty line – set at two dollars a day expressed in PPP terms. Datasets of poverty are rather scanty, and under the consideration that poverty adjusts slowly to underlying factors, in this study missing values in the poverty dataset have been partly estimated through linear interpolation.​[6]​ The poverty dataset is sourced from The World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI).

In terms of recipients’ governance, the dimension considered in this analysis is not focused upon the macroeconomic spectrum as in other studies, but rather upon the civil and political environment in the recipient country. As in De Matteis (2013) civil and political liberties are expressed by the index POLCIV which has been constructed from data from Freedom House Freedom in the World. The index POLCIV is the average of the two scores.​[7]​ 




























Table 1	Evolution of Suits indices






As mentioned earlier on, the consideration that one donor’s decisions about aid supply may affect others’ aid budgets has led to argue about a certain herding behaviour among donors (Jones, 2015, Riddell, 2007; Round and Odedokun, 2004; Cassen, 1986). The analysis of the Suits indices of aid allocation presented above constitutes a good approach to test whether the herding hypothesis holds about the selectivity of aid allocation. Ideally, a test of such hypothesis would entail comparing each donor’s allocation patterns among individual recipient countries eventually targeted. However, we take here a parsimonious approach focused rather on spotting each donor’s changes in terms of overall selectivity in aid allocation. Comparing the evolution of each donor’s overall selectivity can help to shed lights on the eventual presence of herding behaviour. If such behaviour is confirmed and significant between two donors, the direction of causality can help to identify the roles of leader and follower respectively, and the value of ratio 2/h provides a measure of the influence exercised by the leader on the follower. 

Tables A.1 and A.2 in the Annex provide the individual values of 2/h – when this is found significant – while Table 2 summarizes its average values. Each donor is considered both in a leader and follower role in order to account for both its capacity to influence others and its availability or acceptance of being influenced by others. The difference  between the influence exercised on others and the one received from others is taken to measure the net influencing power of each donor. 

Donors are listed according to decreasing leadership score. A negative sign in columns (i), (j), (l), and (m) identifies an influence which is against the general trend. A negative sign in columns (k) and (n) identifies a net follower, and the opposite otherwise. The values in columns (k) and (n) measure each donor’s net influencing power.      




















Switzerland and Germany report the strongest leadership in terms of aid allocation according to poverty. This is reflected in the highest scores of net influential power recorded within the donors’ sample as well as in a large network of influential links. Also Australia, Sweden, Belgium, France and the USA score relatively high in terms of leadership; however their openness to other donors’ influence reduces their net influencing power. All other donors come up rather as followers than leaders and therefore they achieve a negative score as net influencing power. Ireland and Denmark score lowest in the list. 

As shown in Table A.1 and Table A.2, the number of influential links is higher for some countries than for others. And in general terms this is higher when dealing with poverty than with governance. Along the same line, also the size of influence exercised by leaders is larger when dealing with poverty than with governance.

Both the latter points – and notably the lower number of significant influential links among donors in terms of governance – raise concerns over the use of average values for the estimation of a donor’s net influential power. Therefore, while the influential role exercised by Germany and Switzerland in terms of poverty selectivity appears unquestionable, the leadership is less clear when dealing with governance selectivity. In fact, in the latter case the high score achieved by Sweden seems justified, while the low number of significant influential links recorded in the case of Switzerland somehow questions its highest score as net influential power. The same problem is found about Australia. This consideration helps to reconsider the influential relevance of countries with lower – although still remarkable – average scores, as Norway and the UK. Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands score well in terms of leadership, but rather low in terms of net influencing power. The same applies to the USA, who comes up more as a follower than a leader. 

What considered so far reflects average changes occurred over the overall period considered in this study. However, the three decades have seen major events which have changed the geo-political landscape with various implications also on the policy and management of international assistance. In particular, such events as the fall of the Berlin Wall and the beginning of the War on Terror have signed some remarkable changes in almost all donors’ aid allocation priorities and principles. And these changes are expected to have inevitably played a role on donors’ aid allocation practices and selectivity. Table 3 has tried to capture some of these changes by splitting the analysis of influential links into decadal sub-periods. This part is limited to the analysis of aid allocation data with reference to poverty, which – contrary to the case of governance – has gone through major changes over the three decades considered here.

A first finding highlights a certain reduction in the average number of significant relationships in terms of evolution of similarity of donors’ allocation criteria – and expected influential power. Between the eighties and nineties a one third reduction of such an average number is detected. This reduction is quite small in absolute values, considering that the average number of influential links estimated for the overall period is much larger.​[8]​ Nevertheless, the estimated fall in its number is remarkable in relative terms and captures well the break in the established coordination in aid allocation patterns. 

What just said about the identified reduction of the average number of significant influential links established by each donor is reflected by the fall of average values of 2/h, which in this case measures the influential power exercised. In fact, data in Table 3 show how both the influence exercised by donors as well as the one received by them have on average decreased between the eighties and the nineties, before rising again during the third decade considered. The same U-pattern is revealed by the evolution of the average values of the speed of adjustment (3).​[9]​ In other words, the nineties have seen a drastic reduction of donor’s influential performance, as reflected by a reduced frequency of imitative behaviour, as well as by a reduced intensity of influential power, and by a slower imitative approach. On the contrary, the latter two – i.e. intensity of influential power and speed of imitative approach – increased during the following decade. 


Table 3	Changes into main indicators of influential links





The points just highlighted seem to confirm the assumption that the major events occurred on the international scene at the end of the eighties may have contributed to seriously modify donors’ aid allocation patterns. This may involve various factors, such as different donor ability to rapidly adjust to a sudden review of recipient counterparts, as well as some inadequacy of traditional coordination mechanisms. Nevertheless, there are some major exceptions to such general patterns. Some donors, such as Italy, have seen a continuous erosion of their leading capacity, while others, such as the USA, have become more open to other donors’ input. Finally, other donors, such as Switzerland, have combined an increasing leading role and a reduced opening to other donors’ views.

Besides the above, the average evolution of both indicators highlighted above seems to reveal a certain redistributive process among donors, playing them either a leader role or follower role. In fact, for both indicators the identified parabolic evolution appears to be asymmetric when comparing the two roles: with a higher downward arm/branch in the case of leaders and a higher upward arm/branch in the case of followers. Such asymmetry could hint towards a reduction of influential power exercised on average by each leader – or more likely by the major leaders. At the same time the increased influence received on average by each donor in its follower role might be explained by the increased influence exercised by donors which were previously less influential. In other words, the changes highlighted seem to show a redistributive process of donor influential power – at least in terms of aid selectivity – which has led, over the three decades considered, to a more balanced set-up. This consideration is somehow supported by a review of the concentration of 2/h values for each decade. The evolution of the Gini index of the 2/h series, weighted by each donor’s average decadal aid amounts, are shown in Table 4. Despite missing data affect the sample composition in Table 4, results from both the entire sample and the selected sub-sample recall to a large extent the U-shape evolution considered above and seem to support the redistributive process of influential power, with the nineties signing the main phase of transition.


Table 4	Concentration of influencing power

Notes: * without Luxemburg, and Sweden; ** without Italy; *** without Denmark,








With the decline in international aid during the 1990s, the issue of aid allocation and its implications in terms of aid effectiveness naturally came into the spotlight. This gave rise to the concept of aid selectivity. This study has assessed donors’ selectivity by comparing their aid actual allocation against what would be an optimal one according to two of the most commonly used criteria: poverty and governance. In particular, this study has assessed whether the selectivity of donors’ aid allocation reflect an imitative behaviour and, if so, who leads the game and how the game has changed over time.

Initially, it was considered how the three decades between 1980 and 2010 have seen a major increase in progressivity of aid allocation according to needs, as the result of measures aimed at increasing selectivity. Aid allocation according to governance, instead, remained quite stable throughout the period considered, revealing only limited change in selectivity. 

Donors reflect a certain diversity of behavior. Nevertheless, results of the analysis show a general trend of increasing selectivity, particularly with reference to poverty. 
 
The largest increases in selectivity according to poverty are achieved by Ireland, New Zealand, Denmark, Finland, the UK and the Netherlands. With regard to selectivity according to governance, instead, the largest increases of selectivity are reported by Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Finland, New Zealand and Denmark. 

Subsequently, any evidence of herding behaviour in donors’ allocations was tested by comparing the evolution of each donor’s selectivity. This has led to identify leaders and followers among donors, as well as to measure the influence exercised by the leader on the follower. 

Switzerland and Germany report the strongest leadership in terms of aid allocation according to poverty, followed by Australia, Sweden, Belgium, France and the USA. All other donors come up rather as followers than leaders, with Ireland and Denmark scoring lowest in the list. Donors’ leadership is less clear when dealing with governance, confirming a diversified sensitivity towards this criterion. Sweden, Switzerland and Australia score high in the list, but only the first of the three records a high influential power. Norway and the UK follow in the list. Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands score well in terms of leadership, but rather low in terms of net influencing power. The USA comes up more as a follower than a leader.

The analysis has highlighted how one third reduction of the average number of influential links among donors’ allocation decisions was recorded between the eighties and nineties. This reduction captures the break in the established coordination in aid allocation patterns. This is reflected in the evolution of the intensity and speed of the influential power exercised or received by donors, which decreased between the eighties and the nineties, before rising again during the third decade considered.

The above is in line with the view that the major events occurred on the international scene at the end of the eighties may have contributed to seriously modify donors’ aid allocation patterns, generating a certain redistributive process of leadership and influential power among donors. In particular, results of this analysis reveal a reduction of influential power exercised on average by each leader – or more likely by the main leaders – while the influence exercised by donors who were previously less influential may have concurrently increased. This highlights how a redistributive process of donor influential power – at least in terms of aid allocation – has been in place, which has led, over the three decades considered, to a more balanced set-up. 
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Table A.1	Links of influence among donors’ targeting according to recipients’ poverty










Table A.2	Links of influence among donors’ targeting according to recipients’ governance











Table A.3	Evolution of 2/h and  §

























































^1	  The mechanism by which conditionality works is thought to be two-fold. First, aid can be used to ‘reward’ countries that have good policies, and thus incentivize policy changes for other countries. Second, aid is thought to work as a ‘catalyst’ for policy changes.
^2	  See Clemens et al. (2004) among others.
^3	  The donors included in the sample are: Australia (AUL), Austria (AUS), Belgium (BEL), Canada (CAN), Denmark (DEN), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), Germany (GER), Ireland (IRE), Italy (ITA), Japan (JAP), Luxembourg (LUX), Netherlands (NET), New Zealand (NZL), Norway (NOR), Spain (SPA), Sweden (SWE), Switzerland (SWZ), United Kingdom (UK), United States of America (USA). 
^4	  Data on aid provided by Eastern European countries till 1989 is difficult to measure due to the accounting system followed. Data from Arab countries and more recently from China and India are scant.
^5	  The beneficiary countries included in the sample are: Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, India, Iran, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, Laos, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Moldova, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Senegal, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia. 
^6	  Interpolation has been applied only in the presence of a clear trend, and the gaps filled are never longer than five years. It is noted that headcount poverty measures may not clearly identify the proportion of population below a fixed absolute consumption level over time (Reddy and Pogge, 2005; Ravallion, 2008).
^7	  While in the original dataset scores for civil and political liberties are two categorical indexes ranging between 1 and 7, for ease of interpretation in this study the original scores have been inverted: POLCIV = | Average (Freedom House Indexes) – 8 |. Such operation retains the original domain of the indexes. 
^8	  Average value of 2/h for 1980-2010 is 14.48. However, it is necessary to keep in mind that, after all, 2/h is mainly a measure of long-term patterns and that its values are inevitably affected when estimated on sub-periods.  
^9	  Due to incomplete series of 2/h and 3, average values shown in Table 3 – weighted by average decadal amounts of aid – refer only to a limited number of donors considered. In both cases such donor sub-samples reflect a relatively high share of aid, ranging between half and two thirds of the average amounts provided by the entire sample considered in this study. The full set of data on the evolution of 2/h and 3 is reported in Table A.3.
